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2Abstract
Many studies have already acknowledged the importance and useful-
ness of an accurate Internet network topology map. Current eﬀorts
to build this map cannot achieve high coverage and quality levels,
though. A critical factor is the monitor implementation. A monitor
is a network node that executes analyses. In all current eﬀorts they
are in low numbers, ill-located and static, i.e. they do not change
location over time.
In this thesis, I propose the mYriadi solution to the Internet mapping
problem, focusing on its client side design and implementation. Using
cutting-edge traceroute technologies and a crowd-sourcing methodol-
ogy, we distribute a smartphone monitor appliance. Smartphones are
available in high numbers, they are nomadic and always connected
to access networks, which lends the best results. A server appliance
coordinates smartphones and analyses collected data.
After a summary of the best traceroute methods available, I'll discuss
an implementation of a client appliance for iPhone. I'll discuss how
to run a high-speed, eﬃcient and battery-friendly parallel traceroute
analysis in a restricted and unprivileged environment. I will also
present a new technique to contrast the negative eﬀects of a NAPT
router, extremely common in almost all IPv4 access networks, on
parallel traceroute analyses.
The correctness and validity of the platform has been veriﬁed by
reconstructing a map of the GARR network, the Italian research
network. Finally I'll discuss what could be done to further improve
mYriadi and to extend its potential.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet is the ﬁrst thing that humanity has built that
humanity doesn't understand, the largest experiment in anarchy
that we have ever had.
Eric Schmidt
The Internet origins can be traced back to a 1960s US government project
named ARPANET[2]; its commercialization in the 90s resulted in an un-
precedented expansion of the network. In December, 1995 there were 16
millions of users, approximately the 4h of the world population[3]. In
December 31, 2011 there were 2,267,233,742, about 32.7% of the world
population; more details are provided in table 1.1.[1]
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World Population Internet Users Growth
regions (2011 est.) 2000 2011 (%)
Africa 1,037,524,058 4,514,000 139,875,242 2,988.4
Asia 3,879,740,877 114,304,000 1,016,799,076 789.6
Europe 816,426,346 105,096,093 500,723,686 376.4
Middle East 216,258,843 3,284,800 77,020,995 2,244.8
North America 347,394,870 108,096,800 273,067,546 152.6
Latin America 597,283,165 18,068,919 235,819,740 1,205.1
Oceania 35,426,995 7,620,480 23,927,457 214.0
World Total 6,930,055,154 360,985,492 2,267,233,742 528.1
Table 1.1: world Internet usage and population statistics. Credits to Mini-
watts Marketing Group[1]. All statistics are for December 31 of the speciﬁed
year.
The speed at which the Internet evolved is one of the many insight oﬀered
by the aforementioned table: i.e., Internet grew at a very fast pace in twelve
years. This table shows that Africa, Middle East and Latin America grew
more than 1,000%, noteworthy. The bigger Internet becomes, the stronger
is the need to discover which laws control its expansion and why, which
model deﬁnes its topology.
An Internet evolution model would help in several ﬁelds; the following is
a non-exhaustive1 list of ﬁelds and applications that will beneﬁt from this
information:
• protocol development could use such knowledge to improve protocols'
eﬃciency and scalability[4];
• data storage and caching techniques;
• informatics virus diﬀusion and containment[5];
• infrastructure deployment;
• social studies related to Internet coverage and availability[6].
An Internet topology map is strongly needed. Other than providing a better
comprehension of the underlying laws that control Internet expansion and
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the ability to anticipate its growth, such knowledge would allow better,
safer and more precise ﬁnancial investments.
It is, therefore, a proﬁtable achievement from both a scientiﬁc and social-
economic perspective, and it's constantly gathering attention since the last
years. Nevertheless, a reliable Internet topology map is still missing, not
for lack of trying:
• ISPs1, mobile operators and enterprises do not reveal their network
topology;
• previous analysis campaigns had few, ill-located monitors2, with lim-
ited scalability and coverage;
• some enabling methodologies were not fully developed until the last
ﬁve years.
Internet can be described by maps with diﬀerent levels of abstraction:
• interface maps describe the Internet as an ensemble of links that con-
nect two interfaces together. This is the most detailed map possible;
the main drawback of this representation is that the methods that
generate such output do not group interfaces as routers. Traceroute
oﬀers this kind of detail, and this representation is discussed in the
next section.
• Router maps describe the Internet as an ensemble of links between
routers. It's possible to create a router map starting from a interface
map with dealiasing techniques[7].
• AS maps describe the Internet as an ensemble of links between ASes3.
It's possible to map IP addresses to ASes.
1Internet Service Provider(s).
2A monitor is a terminal that executes some kind of analysis to (partially) discover
the network topology it's attached to.
3An Autonomous System is a collection of connected IP routing preﬁxes under the
control of one or more network operators that presents a common, clearly deﬁned routing
policy to the Internet.
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There are two main analysis methodologies categories: active and passive.
Active methods, like traceroute, require monitors to carefully craft pack-
ets and inject them probe the network.[8] Passive methods, like BGP4
sniﬃng, require monitors to collect BGP updates and to examine BGP
tables[9]; such monitors must be in a privileged position in the network to
receive such information. In this work, we will focus on active methods,
using the traceroute method described in section 2.1.
1.1 mYriadi: a client-server Internet
topology mapping system
mYriadi is an eﬀort to map the Internet using bleeding-edge network anal-
yses in mobile devices, under control of a server. Using a crowd-sourcing
paradigm, in which a smartphone user runs a software, the system collects
data on cellular and ﬁxed networks in an opportunistic manner.
This architecture provides nomadic monitors, all spread over the globe,
thus increasing the network coverage and helping the discovery of links
diﬃcult to detect otherwise. Clients request jobs to the server with a pre-
set frequency in the background; the server selects targets with respect to
several factors:
• geographic location (i.e. in which country the smartphone is);
• network location (i.e. to which network the smartphone is connected).
Clients run a traceroutesection 2.1 based analysis with a parallel, modiﬁed
version of the MDA[10] algorithm, described in section 2.3, improved to
run in unprivileged environments with limited bandwidth. This improved
algorithm, described in section 3.3, is capable of bypassing NAPT, Network
Address and Port Translator5, being able to anticipate the new values a
router will insert in a packet when it leaves the router. A modiﬁed version
of the MIDAR algorithm, described in section 2.4, provides an eﬃcient
4Border Gateway Protocol.
5A Network Address and Port Translator is a device that replaces private IP ad-
dress with one public IP address, using higher level information to diﬀerentiate outgoing
packets from diﬀerent private addresses.
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dealiasing functionality, so clients will send router maps instead of interface
maps, taking oﬀ some computational load from the server.
The server carefully selects targets for each client who requests that with
respect to several factors, like their location both in the globe and in the
network. It also manages all client-submitted data, executing the following
operations:
• router map to AS map conversion;
• conﬂict identiﬁcation, isolation and resolution;
• data aggregation into a uniﬁed graph.
The router-AS map conversion greatly simpliﬁes graphs, and also mitigates
the eﬀect of a per-packet load balancer6. The server-side conﬂict manage-
ment assures that a misbehaving client won't insert anomalies in the AS
server. The server does not need to run any kind of analysis, and is thus
free of such a network and computational burden. Server-side algorithms,
design and implementation will not be discussed in this work since they are
out of its scope; for further information please refer to[11].
These aspects give mYriadi an edge over all Internet mapping projects:
• mYriadi platform has a low cost: since servers only coordinate clients
and they do not participate in analyses (only clients do), a single
server machine could handle a sheer number of terminals.
• mYriadi platform is opportunistic, nomadic: clients aren't ﬁxed, but
they are attached to the extremities of the network, with considerable
gains in terms of coverage.
1.2 The challenge
This thesis is focused on mYriadi's client-side aspects. Therefore, the target
of this work is to create a smartphone software that acts as a mYriadi client.
A mYriadi client should be:
6The router-AS conversion will hide the eﬀect of per-packet load balancers in ASes'
networks.
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generic it should be able to execute many diﬀerent analysis typologies;
opportunistic it should contact the server and request an analysis each
time it thinks there is an opportunity;
battery-friendly it should run its analysis as quick as possible, generating
as much data as it can without depleting its power reserve;
data-friendly it should guarantee a high conﬁdence level on the data it
produces using metered connections as little as possible;
unobtrusive it should be as autonomous as possible in order to not disturb
the user.
The product of this thesis is composed of two pieces of software:
MapLibrary a static iOS 4+ library that exposes all the functionalities
needed to communicate with the server, run background analyses and
manage data on the phone's memory. It implements a traceroute
analysis, but it's designed to be easy to add other analysis method-
ologies.
mYriadi client an iOS 4+ application that uses MapLibrary to run net-
work analyses. It uses Apple's MapKit to provide the user with a
geographic visual feedback, as in ﬁgure 1.1. Attractive visual feedback
is a very important aspect in a crowd-sourced application.
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Figure 1.1: mYriadi client interface, running an analysis from Pisa. The
user can touch a pin to show more information about each node discovered.
Chapter 2
Traceroute and state of the art
If I have seen further it is by standing on ye sholders of Giants.
Isaac Newton
mYriadi is based on traceroute, an active analysis method that discovers
routers between two nodes. Traceroute is a well-known technique which
also has many ﬂaws. In section 2.1 I'll describe the mechanism behind the
standard traceroute and its pitfalls. Once these issues have been identiﬁed,
I'll brieﬂy describe already-developed techniques that solve them: Paris
Traceroute in section 2.2 and MDA in section 2.3. MIDAR, a dealiasing
technique presented in section 2.4, is used to identify which interfaces are on
the same router. In section 2.5 I will also identify some possible competitors
and/or related projects and summarize their work and how mYriadi stands
up to them.
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2.1 Traceroute analysis
A traceroute analysis discovers the sequence of router interfaces an IP
packet follows across an IP network in order to reach a given target[12]. The
Internet Control Message Protocol[13] is the foundation of this method.
Let's deﬁne as source the host that runs the traceroute analysis toward a
certain target. The output of a traceroute analysis is a list of IP addresses:
the source therefore creates a list and insert its IP address in it.
The source sends an IP packet to the targeted IP address with increasing
TTL, starting from 1. The IP payload contains an ICMP Echo request
message1.
When a router receives an IP packet, it decreases the packet's TTL by 1.
If the original value is either one or zero the router will drop the packet
and, in addition, it might send back an ICMP Time Exceeded message to
notify the source that its packet has been dropped. The source address
ﬁeld of the IP header of this notiﬁcation is the IP address of the interface
that the router used to generate the ICMP Time Exceeded message2. The
ICMP Time Exceeded also quote the IP and level 4 protocol headers of
the incoming packet[14].
The source will receive this notiﬁcation and will then append the notiﬁ-
cation's source IP address to the list. The source will send then another
packet with the TTL value increased by one. If the source doesn't receive
any notiﬁcation, it might do one of the following:
• retry to send the same IP packet again;
• send a new IP packet with the TTL value increased by one, registering
that there's a hole in the path;
• stop the analysis.
When the destination target receive an IP packet, it might send back an
ICMP Echo response message to the source. When the source receives this
1Protocols other than ICMP can be used, but they require diﬀerent analysis arrest
criteria.
2Some routers will use the same IP address regardless of the interface that received
the incriminated IP packet.
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message, it will append the target's IP address to the list and stop the
analysis.
2.1.1 Inferred topology and dealiasing
Although links are bidirectional, a directed graph is used to represent
traceroute-inferred topologies: the interface we discover at each hop (there-
fore excluding the ﬁrst IP address, which is the outgoing interface of the
host) are the interface the packets reached, assuming all the router behave
correctly. There is no way to discover which outgoing interface a router
used to reach the following router's incoming interface.
Obviously, a router is composed of a plurality of interfaces, but the tracer-
oute analysis alone cannot discover when two interfaces belong to the same
router. A dealiasing technique is therefore needed.
Router 1
C E
D F
Source 1 A T1
Source 2 B T2
Figure 2.1: Example of a traceroute-inferred topology after two analysis to
T1 and T2.
Figure 2.1 show a topology obtained by joining the output of two analyses
to T1 and T2 from two diﬀerent sources. C and D might be interfaces
of the same router, but a traceroute-only analysis cannot discover such
information. A dealiasing technique must be adopted.
It's possible to evaluate the RTT3 for each node discovered in the traceroute;
unfortunately, there is no guarantee that:
3Round-Trip Time, the sum of time a packet takes to reach a node in the network
and the time the corresponding ICMP notiﬁcation takes to get back to the source.
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• a load balancing operation has not occurred somewhere in the path
traveled by the packet;
• the ICMP notiﬁcation will follow the inverse path back to the source;
• the ICMP will be sent from the same interface that received the orig-
inating packet.
From the RTT is possible to evaluate the delay of each discovered link.
Let's deﬁne the generic link from node U to V as {U, V }, with delay . A
path can be represented as a sequence of links, starting from Source and
ending with T. If the RTT of a node U, RTTU , is:
RTTU = 2
∑
{A,B}∈path toU
δ{A,B} (2.1)
the delay δ{U,V } is:
δ{U,V } =
RTTV −RTTU
2
=
RTTV
2
−
∑
{A,B}∈path toU
δ{A,B} (2.2)
The information inferred with this method are not accurate with only one
measurement, since variations in the traﬃc load of a link - one of many
other factors - may inﬂuence the measurement of a node's RTT[15]. This
means that a simple delay measurement could lead to negative delay values,
which are clearly not possible. Let's consider equation 2.2 and let's suppose
that:
RTTU > RTTV
which is a possible outcome. This will lead us to:
δ{U,V } < 0
2.1.2 Load balancing and its eﬀects on traceroute
A load balancing router (load balancer from now on) splits outgoing packets
between two or more interfaces; the path starting from each interface is
equivalent metric-wise[16]. Network administrators employ load balancing
to enhance reliability and increase resource utilization. OSPF[17] and IS-
IS[18] intradomain routing protocols both support equal cost multipath. A
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multi-homed stub network can also use load balancing to choose which of
its internet service providers will receive which packets.[19]
Consider a textbook scenario where the source A wants to execute a tracer-
oute to the target T, as in ﬁgure 2.2, where each node represents a router's
interface.
A B
C
D
E
F
G
T
Figure 2.2: load balancing scenario.
Suppose that B is a load balancer that splits 50% of the traﬃc to T using
the C-E-G path, while the remaining 50% uses the D-F-G path. Assuming
there is no other network traﬃc, B alternate between the two paths when
forwarding packets to T.
Assuming a packet loss of zero, a traceroute analysis might discover either
scenario A or scenario B, as in ﬁgure 2.3.
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A B
C
D F
E
G
T
(a) traceroute-inferred topology in a load balancing scenario, outcome A.
B
C
D
E
G
F
T
A
(b) traceroute-inferred topology in a load balancing scenario, outcome B.
Figure 2.3: traceroute analysis outcomes in a
In each scenario there is a single false positive (the red arrow) and false
negatives (all the dotted arrows).
2.1.3 Zero-forwarding routers
Some routers do not check the TTL value when forwarding an IP packet.
These routers are referred as zero-forwarding routers, or zero-forwarders,
since they forward packets with a TTL value of 0. Their presence aﬀects
the analysis in two ways:
• a zero-forwarder cannot be directly detected;
• the following router in the path will answer twice:
 the ﬁrst time when it receives the packet the zero-forwarders
should have dropped, with a TTL value of 0;
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 the second time when it receives the follow-up packet with TTL
set to 1.
This creates a loop, that is a router that has itself as a next-hop. Figure
2.4 shows a traceroute analysis scenario where B is a zero-forwarder.
A
B
C D
Figure 2.4: traceroute analysis with a zero-forwarding router B.
2.2 Paris Traceroute
Paris Traceroute[20] is an improvement of the classic traceroute analysis
that addresses load balancing problems. In their work, the authors recognize
the eﬀects that load balancing has with respect to a traceroute analysis,
eﬀects already discussed in the previous section.
Let's consider a load balancing router that must choose one of N interfaces
to forward a packet. A load balancing policy can be:
per-packet the router uniformly distributes packets one-at-a-time among
all interfaces;
per-ﬂow the router uses the ﬁve-tuple4 and the IP ToS ﬁeld to select the
outgoing interface;
per-destination the router only uses the destination address to select the
outgoing interface5; it's a subset of the per-ﬂow load balancing.
4Source and destination IP address and transport port, and transport protocol id
(the value of the IP header's Protocol ﬁeld).
5Per-destination load balancing must not be confused with IP forwarding. The latter
deﬁnes the packet's next hop, the former deﬁnes which interface must be used to reach
the next hop.
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The classic traceroute analysis doesn't deﬁne the values that the various
ﬁelds in the IP and transport headers must have: these values vary during
the scan.
Paris traceroute, by requiring that all ﬁelds that might discriminate the
outgoing interface of a load balancer always have the same value, eludes
the negative eﬀects of per-ﬂow (and thus, by extension, per-destination)
load balancing6.
The subset of the headers' ﬁelds that discriminates the outgoing interface
is called Flow ID. Figure 2.5 shows the IP header's ﬁelds that concur in the
Flow ID.
Version IHL TOS(ﬂow ID) Total length
Identiﬁcation Flags Fragment oﬀset
TTL Protocol(ﬂow ID) Header checksum
Source address (ﬂow ID)
Destination address (ﬂow ID)
Figure 2.5: IP header with ﬂow ID ﬁelds.
Depending on the protocol used, the implementation might vary. While the
authors consider ICMP, UDP and TCP, I will not cover the latter, since it
cannot be used in a restricted environment.
Let's ﬁrst consider UDP: ﬁgure 2.6 shows the UDP packet header format.
Source port (ﬂow ID) Destination port (ﬂow ID)
Length Checksum
Figure 2.6: UDP header.
The Checksum ﬁeld is used to recognize an incoming ICMP message as a
response to a packet. This requires to add at least 2 bytes of payload to
6Per-packet load balancing issues persist.
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steer the checksum towards a chosen value. When a UDP packet reaches
its target, a ICMP Port Unreachable might be generated and sent back to
the source; this notiﬁcation plays the same role of ICMP Echo Response.
The ICMP implementation uses ICMP Echo Request messages to trigger
notiﬁcations. Figure 2.7 shows the message format.
Type = 8
(ﬂow ID)
Code
(ﬂow ID)
Checksum (ﬂow ID)
Identiﬁer Sequence Number
Figure 2.7: ICMP Echo request header.
To recognize an incoming ICMP message as a response to a packet, it's
necessary to use either Identiﬁer or Sequence Number to store an ID that
pairs up the outgoing packet with the incoming notiﬁcation. Since ICMP
Checksum ﬁeld is part of the ﬂow ID, the unused ﬁeld must be varied in
order to obtain the desired checksum.
Payload may be used, but it's unnecessary and wasteful, and there is not
guarantee that the corresponding ICMP notiﬁcation will carry the original
payload.
UDP sockets are always available without special privileges in all systems
that implement BSD sockets. Yet the access to ICMP socket eases the pair-
ing process, especially behind a NAPT, using a parallel traceroute analysis.
A technique to solve this issue is proposed in subsection3.3.7. In order to
use ICMP without using raw sockets, unprivileged ICMP sockets must be
available. At the time of the writing, only XNU/BSD kernels7 and Linux
3.0+ kernels8 have them. This thesis implements both UDP and ICMP
methods over iOS.
7Mac Os X, starting from Snow Leopard, and iOS 4 (and above) from Apple are
known OSes that support ICMP sockets.
8Android 4.0 Ice Cream Sandwich should have a 3.0 kernel. Unprivileged ICMP
socket support has been introduced in 3.0 kernel as a kernel option, and it has been
backported to 2.6 kernel for increased security. Unfortunately no assumption can be
made over which device will have such functionality, due to fragmentation in the Android
platform.
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Some routers might not answer to ICMP requests, but will generate ICMP
notiﬁcations for UDP packets. This gives UDP an edge over ICMP, al-
though it has a slightly higher data usage.
In conclusion, Paris Traceroute avoids the eﬀects of load balancers, iden-
tifying a single path. The next step is discovering all paths toward a
destination.
2.3 MDA: Multipath Detection Algorithm
MDA[10] is an evolution of Paris Traceroute algorithm that tries to discover
all the outgoing links of a load balancing router.
Let's assume that we have a packet with ﬂow ID α that is know to reach
router U with TTL x. We assume that there are n = 0 conﬁrmed routers
successors to U, and we want to have a conﬁdence degree of 95%.
A new packet α′, created from α with some criteria, is then sent with TTL
x: until a α∗ 6= α packet that reaches U is found, a new α′ is created. Then
α∗ is sent with its TTL increased by one. If a new successor of U is found,
n is increased. If six packets are sent without discovering a new link, we
are 95% sure that there are n links leaving router U toward our target. In
a worst case scenario, where only the sixth packet reaches a new node, 96
packets are sent9.
There are two packet modiﬁcation criteria:
ﬁxed destination the IP destination address is kept ﬁxed, while all the other
parameters are randomized. This helps identifying per-ﬂow load
balancers. Since the destination address doesn't change, the
analysis doesn't spread through the network. In a restricted
environment, IP source address and ICMP code ﬁelds cannot
be modiﬁed, but are ﬁxed by the OS to the source's outgoing
interface and 0, respectively.
varying destination the IP destination address is modiﬁed: a /29 subnet
is created around the target IP address and new addresses are
9The authors assume that routers support up to a maximum of 16 interfaces when
load balancing.
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created by extracting every possible IP in the subnet, eventually
decreasing the preﬁx length when a subnet is exhausted. All the
other ﬁelds in the Flow ID are ﬁxed. This method discovers the
outgoing links of per-destination load balancers and, since the
destination address is part of the ﬂow ID, also of per-ﬂow load
balancers. An analysis executed with this criteria has a big
spread: this might have a negative impact in some scenarios
when running a parallel analysis, inferring non-existent links
when encountering a per-packet load balancer.
MDA runs this method for each node it discovers, starting from the de-
fault gateway10; the output is an interface graph. The next step would be
generating a router map from it.
2.4 MIDAR: Monotonic ID based Alias
Resolution
MIDAR[21, 22] stands for Monotonic ID-Based Alias Resolution: an IPv4
dealiasing technique, it's an extension of the RadarGun approach[23].
At the basis of MIDAR there is the shared-counter assumption. Each time
a router's interface crafts11 an IP packet, it will insert a value in the IP
ID ﬁeld12. This value is generated from a counter, which is assumed to be
shared between interfaces of the same router. Therefore, two interfaces on
the same router probed closely in time will return similar IP ID values; if
probed repeatedly over time, they will return similar time series of IP ID.
MIDAR uses a monotonic test in order to pair up two interfaces. Since all
the IP ID values generated from a router come from a counter, the time
series built by merging all interfaces' time series must be monotonically
increasing. This is a necessary condition, therefore two interfaces that do
not meet this criteria do not belong to the same router.
The actual MIDAR algorithm is more complex than the following, since
it's standalone. Our goal is to insert its behavior in a traceroute analysis,
10We assume that the device running MDA won't use load balancing itself.
11This assumption does not apply to forwarded packets.
12This ﬁeld, a 16-bit value in the IPv4 header, is normally used for packet fragmen-
tation and reassembly.
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without sending packets explicitly for dealiasing operations. Following this
premise, a MIDAR probe could easily be a traceroute probe. An answer to
a MIDAR probe is deﬁned as MIDAR answer, and it is composed of the
following information:
• answer's IP ID value;
• probe-answer RTT;
• incoming packet timestamp - i.e. its time of arrival.
A timestamp-ordered sequence of MIDAR answers is a time series. Let's
suppose that we have two series S1 and S2 of their respective interfaces I1
and I2. A preliminary analysis will identify all wrap-arounds and it will
correct them: since each time series must be monotonically increasing, each
value that is not greater than its predecessor must be increased by 216 until
it's greater:
Listing 2.1: MIDAR time series wrap-around correction
f o r answer in s e r i e s :
whi l e answer . id <= answer . p r edec e s s o r . id :
answer . id += 2∗∗16
Now let M be the time series created by merging S1 with S2. If I1 and I2
are aliases of the same router, then it must be monotonically increasing.
RTT is used as a timestamp tolerance, as shown in ﬁgure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8: MIDAR monotonic test with RTT tolerance
2.5 Competitors
There are, of course, other Internet mapping projects. The most known
ones are RocketFuel, CAIDA's ARK and DIMES. I will brieﬂy describe
their features and objectives and I will compare mYriadi to them.
2.5.1 RocketFuel
The RocketFuel project produces an ISP's internal network topology map-
ping system. This project has been tested on 10 ISPs, with about 800
monitors distributed on web servers. Their last paper is dated 2003.
Its monitors are ﬁxed, and each one is restrained to the ISP network it
belongs to. In contrast, mYriadi monitors are nomadic and without any
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restriction, as they can be anywhere on Earth as long as they can detect
their location.
2.5.2 CAIDA ARK
CAIDA(Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis) is an organi-
zation that fetches, analyses and publishes information about Internet at
a global scale. It hosts the ARK project (Archipelago), in which dedi-
cated servers, that act as monitors, are deployed across the globe and they
analyse, at regular intervals, the entire set of public IP addresses. Targets
are split between monitors. There are three teams with an average of 18
monitors per team. This project is running since 2007.
ARK's monitors are ﬁxed and in low numbers - hardware deployment is
needed. mYriadi has a much greater potential, since it's much easier to
distribute and host a smartphone application than a device. Our approach
requires less investment than ARK's, and has a much bigger user potential.
In addition, mYriadi target selection mechanism is dynamic and aware of
the smartphone context; ARK's monitors are not, since their context never
changes.
2.5.3 DIMES
The DIMES project oﬀers a free client software that runs on almost all
computers and OSes, starting from 2004. Target selection depends on client
position and other parameters.
DIMES monitors are ﬁxed, while mYriadi's are nomadic: this provides us
greater coverage than DIMES.
Chapter 3
System structure
Secretum victoriae in organizatium nunc obvii ist.
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus
mYriadi platform is composed of a server, that runs the mYriadi server
appliance, and a multitude of clients, that run the mYriadi client app.
In section 3.1 I will introduce mYriadi's global architecture. In section 3.2 I
will describe the design and implementation of MapLibrary, the library that
provides client mapping facilities. A detailed description of an improved
parallel traceroute analysis is provided in section 3.3, along with an analysis
example to better explain the analysis' logic. In section 3.4 I'll present
and describe mYriadi's client-server protocol, which speciﬁes how the two
appliances should communicate and which data is available to who.
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3.1 Overall system architecture
Figure 3.1: overall client-server architecture with job dataﬂow, supported
by mYriadi's client-server protocol
Figure 3.1 shows mYriadi dataﬂow amongst clients and server. In this sub-
chapter we will refer to this image when discussing mYriadi's core elements.
The overall platform is based on the concept of job. A job is a task assigned
by the server to a client. Clients request job to the server when they are
available or when they think there might be an analysis opportunity. The
server may or may not provide a job to a client. If provided, such job would
be tailored to the client's network and geographic context, other than its
capabilities.
A job deﬁnes the analysis that the client will run, along with its parameters.
Once a client receives a job, it might start the analysis as soon as the job
is assigned or, if something happens1, delay its execution. Both the client
and the server have validation logic that deny or discard jobs: the client
can deny a job execution if the network has been changed, or it can discard
it if its results are evaluated as not valid. The server can discard incoming
job results if they have a low quality. The mYriadi version on which this
thesis is built deﬁnes a traceroute-based analysis only.
1I.E. a short loss of connectivity, or a system reboot.
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The interactions between client and server are shown in ﬁgure 3.1:
1. job request: the client requests a job to the server;
2. task assignment: the server evaluates whether to assign a job or not
and which one, based on its task policy (see subsection 3.1.1);
3. job assignment: the server sends the job to the client, if any (otherwise
it sends a no job message and there are no more interactions in this
batch);
4. client job cycle: the client executes the job, see 3.2.1;
5. job results: the client sends back to the server the outcome of the
analysis;
6. elaboration: the server elaborates the received data.
3.1.1 Server's role and task selection policies
mYriadi server's role is twofold:
• It manages clients in order to maximize the amount of network map-
ping information. It carefully chooses a job for each client according
to a certain policy. This is step 2 in ﬁgure 3.1.
• It manipulates and merge clients-generated data, step 6 in ﬁgure 3.1.
Jobs parameters vary with the speciﬁed analysis.
Client geolocation-based policies
A client geolocation-based policy selects targets using the following infor-
mation:
• client geolocation;
• networks with a known geolocation;
• already known routes between ASes.
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In this version, the server implements two diﬀerent client geolocation-based
policies:
• farthest network around the world;
• farthest network in country.
Client network-based policies
A client network-based policy selects targets using the following informa-
tion:
• the AS number associated to the client's public IP address;
• an already deﬁned target list.
This class of policies is useful to implement mapping campaigns with very
precise targets. In this version, only the static list policy is deﬁned. This
policy has been designed to detect paths starting from a source AS to a
predeﬁned ASes list, passing through a chosen transit AS2.
Client geolocation-network-based policies
This class is a mix of the two aforementioned policies. It selects targets
using the following information:
• client geolocation;
• the AS number associated to the client's public IP address;
• networks with a known geolocation;
• network with a know AS number conversion;
• already known routes between ASes.
In the current mYriadi version, the nearest ASN stub is the only policy
implemented in this class.
2I.e. an IXP, Internet eXchange Point.
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3.1.2 Geolocation and its power consumption in iOS
4+
When a client requests a job, it also communicates its geolocation. iOS
devices have multiple methods to discover their position:
Cell-tower triangulation it requires cellular network connectivity and
it's the less accurate, but it's also the less power-hungry method,
since it doesn't require to power on additional hardware, and it works
indoor too, as long as there's signal.3
Wiﬁ-based if the device is in range of a 802.11 network, the access point's
MAC address might be used to retrieve the network's geolocation
and, by approximation, the device's4. If more networks are in range,
triangulation might help increasing the accuracy. It requires Internet
connectivity and the 802.11 radio must be on, it's more accurate than
cell-tower triangulation but less than GPS. It doesn't require wiﬁ
authentication and it works indoor. This method is also known as
WPS, Wi-ﬁ Positioning System5
GPS it requires power to the GPS receiver and it depletes the device's
battery really fast. It's also the most accurate method available, but
it suﬀers from poor reception inside buildings, since the GPS signal
is quite faint.
It's not necessary to have an high precision6, so there's usually no need to
use GPS - the other network-based location methods are ﬁne, and they are
also more power eﬃcient and faster than GPS.
iOS, starting from version 4, oﬀers a Signiﬁcant Location Change facility,
in addition to a ﬁne-tunable facility, that automatically selects the most
energy-eﬃcient method (which is usually the least accurate) to detect and
signal signiﬁcant changes in location.
3http://searchengineland.com/cell-phone-triangulation-accuracy-is-all-over-the-
map-14790 has a non technical description of this feature.
4As an example, Google Street View cars detect 802.11 networks and register their
location based on the car's. After an access point has been located, a device might use
this service within reach of its network.
5Not to be confused with Wi-ﬁ Protected Setup.
6Server-side task selection policies do not need a very accurate location, since we do
not expect any diﬀerence when moving between streets of the same city.
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3.1.3 Client visual feedback and IP geolocation
The server appliance oﬀers an IP geolocation service. The client can query
the server to geolocate an IPv4/v6 address, so it can show on a map the
location of each node.
This service concurs in the implementation of a visual feedback for the
client's user. In the crowdsourcing paradigm it's very important to moti-
vate users to run the application. Showing them the information collection
generated by their devices is a great motivational tool, as other crowd-
sourced monitoring applications have already demonstrated. For this very
reason, it's desirable to run this service, although it's not mandatory.
In order to minimize data usage, these information are cached. The client
queries the server on a on-demand basis: it won't generate any query when
the application is running in the background.
3.2 Detailed MapLibrary architecture
3.2.1 MapLibrary structure
As showed in ﬁgure 3.2, there are three main modules in MapLibrary:
• the Communication module implements the client-server protocol and
the job abstraction;
• the Analyses macromodule provides an abstraction to implement anal-
ysis methodologies in a modular way;
• the Common classes and utilities macromodule oﬀers commonly-used
services and facilities, such as data storage and communication.
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Figure 3.2: MapLibrary modules
Common classes and utilities
This macromodule contains the following elements:
GenericSocket this module oﬀers an easy-to-use generic BSD socket inter-
face, along with a specialized interface that implements traﬃc shaping
functions. There are several advantages over standard BSD socket:
they are automatically managed by Objective-C ARC, and they can
be specialized to implement speciﬁc analysis methods.
IPAddress this interface stores either an IPv4 or IPv6 address, allowing
for better modularity. It also performs some operations like detecting
if an address is private.
AddressDiscovery this interface fetches the IP address of each device's
network interface.
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DataManager this interface stores and loads data and settings from the
device's persistent memory. This interface can handle all objects that
are serializable.
EventLogging this module provides a logging facility, that saves log mes-
sages to ﬁle and print them on the debugging console.
Analyses macromodule
Each module in this macromodule provides an analysis methodology. An
analysis module should provide:
• a specialized job interface, that inherits from generic job, which adapts
the already mentioned job operations to work with the analysis;
• a serializable data structure that can be handled by DataManager.
Communication module
The communication module has two main elements, the Ambassador and
the GenericJob interfaces.
The Ambassador interface implements mYriadi's client-server protocol.
It handles job request, retrieval, execution and data delivery through the
GenericJob interface; these four operations are referred as work cycle.
Ambassador is indeed analysis-agnostic: each Analysis module must spe-
cialize GenericJob so that they can be executed by the Ambassador module.
This abstraction layer provides modularity and isolation between modules.
Ambassador keeps the application in background when needed. It spon-
taneously activate the job cycle when a particular condition is triggered,
like a change of location or IP address, or the timeout of a periodic timer.
In testing environments or intensive campaigns7 a continuous mode can be
enabled, where the client will rentlessly start a job cycle whenever possible
- it stresses the battery, so it should be enabled only when necessary.
The full Ambassador ﬂowchart is in ﬁgure 3.3. This ﬁgure contains both
the location manager handler and the work cycle, and it's very useful to
understand how the client operates.
7As in our validation task, see chapter 4.
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Figure 3.3: full Ambassador ﬂowchart
Job cycle The client-side representation of a job has a predetermined
lifespan, which encompasses 8 diﬀerent statuses. Figure 3.4 shows a status
transition graph.
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No information
No targetUnchecked
Obsolete Committed
Validated
Analyzed
Confirmed
Figure 3.4: job status transition graph. Red nodes are marked as deletable,
blue nodes are marked as work required and green nodes are marked as
ready for transmission. A newly-created job always start from No infor-
mation.
There are three status categories: deletable, work required and ready
for transmission; they are used in control points inside a work cycle.
There are a few job operations that modify a job status. These operation
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must be executed without interruptions, and any amount of time might
pass between the execution of two diﬀerent operations.
Job request the ambassador requests to the server a job, using a newly
created client-side job (with no information status) to store the results
of the operation. A job may or may not be assigned, therefore the job
becomes either unchecked or with no target.
Job validation an unchecked job must be validated before starting an
analysis, since the context might have changed since job request. Al-
ready validated jobs can be validated again. A job might become
obsolete; the criteria for such decision are analysis-dependent.
Job analysis execution the analysis is executed. To guarantee that a job
is not obsolete before executing the analysis, a validation operation
is always executed before launching the analysis. The job becomes
either obsolete or analysed, starting from a validated or unchecked
job.
Job conﬁrmation the analysis results of an analysed job must be val-
idated, implementing a client-side early refusal detection (i.e., the
server might always drop results that match a certain pattern - if the
client can execute this evaluation it's better to drop the job client-
side, to avoid waste of bandwidth, server time and energy). The job
becomes either obsolete or conﬁrmed.
Job commit the analysis results of a conﬁrmed job are sent back to the
server. The job always becomes committed.
Job transmission the ordered execution of job conﬁrmation and commit.
The following list describes each status:
No information the job has been just created, therefore it stores no infor-
mation. A stray job with no information can and should be deleted.
Unchecked after a successful job request, a job becomes unchecked. An
unchecked job deﬁnes the analysis to execute, and stores relevant con-
text information when the job has been assigned. It requires work,
since its analysis has yet to be executed.
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No target a client-side job becomes with no target after an unsuccessful
job request, since the server has no job for the requesting client - it
can be safely deleted, since it serves no purpose.
Obsolete a job that refers to an old context and that is, therefore, obsolete
and deletable.
Validated a job is valid at a certain time if the context hasn't changed.
An already validated job can become obsolete if validated again. It
requires work, since its analysis has yet to be executed.
Analysed a job that has analysis results, that is, its analysis has been
completed. Nothing is known yet about the validity of its results.
This job is ready for transmission.
Conﬁrmed a job with valid analysis results, which is therefore ready for
transmission.
Committed a job whose results have been sent to the serve without errors.
The server have either accepted or dropped them. It can be safely
deleted.
Work cycle A work cycle is composed of the following steps:
1. (preliminary transmission checkpoint) execute a job transmission op-
eration (which in turn executes a job conﬁrmation) for every job that
is ready for transmission (step 5 in 3.1);
2. (preliminary deletion checkpoint) delete every deletable job;
3. (resume work checkpoint) ﬁnd a job that requires work and refer to
it as current job - if a job is found skip to step 5;
4. (fetch work) create a job and execute a job request (step 1 and 3 in
ﬁgure 3.1) - if job has no target, delete it and terminate the work
cycle, otherwise refer to it as current job;
5. (execution) run a job analysis execution on the current job (which in
turn executes an additional validation), step 4 in ﬁgure For 3.1;
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6. (transmission checkpoint) execute a job transmission operation (which
in turn executes a job conﬁrmation) for every job that is ready for
transmission (step 5 in 3.1);
7. (deletion checkpoint) delete every deletable job.
Unless there is a temporary failure, steps 6 and 7 will only work on the
current job. A work cycle is composed of multiple job transmission and
deletions; only one job analysis per cycle might be executed.
Triggers and background execution There are multiple ways to start
a work cycle:
manual the user explicitly starts an analysis interacting with the UI8;
timeout if enabled, a timer will set oﬀ periodically and start a work cycle
every x seconds9;
location changes if enabled, a signiﬁcant location change will start a new
work cycle;
network changes if enabled, a network change (WiFi SSID, cellular net-
work operator, IP address) will start a new work cycle.
iOS applications have severe background execution limitations. When an
applications moves from foreground to background, the OS will freeze the
application's context, which will be either reloaded, if the user brings the
application back to foreground, or deleted, if the OS needs more memory.
iOS provides a few handlers that allow the application to react to these
events and store its state and any unsaved data. An application may request
time to ﬁnish background tasks; the OS will keep the application running
in background until it decides that background execution is not allowed
anymore10. The application must signal that it's executing background-
enabled code as in listing 3.1, as well as an emergency expiration handler
that stops the background task as fast as possible. If an expiration handler
doesn't stop its task, iOS will kill the application.
8Some UI designs might not provide such method of interaction by choice.
9If the continuous mode is enabled, x = 0.
10Apple documentation does not specify which conditions must be met to stop back-
ground execution.
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Listing 3.1: background task signaling
1 UIAppl icat ion ∗ app = [ UIAppl icat ion sharedAppl i ca t ion ] ;
2
3 // de f i n e a background ta s k wi th a terminat ion hand ler
4 UIBackgroundTaskIdent i f i e r bid = 0 ;
5 bid = [ app beginBackgroundTaskWithExpirationHandler :^{
6 // e xp i r a t i on hand ler code b l o c k
7 [ app endBackgroundTask : bid ] ;
8 } ] ;
9
10 // background code here
11
12 [ app endBackgroundTask : bid ] ;
Timeout and network changes methods requires exploitation of iOS location
manager to run in background. Whenever the application starts, Ambas-
sador will start a location manager. If spontaneous analyses are enabled it
will start the standard location manager, otherwise it will start the signif-
icant location changes manager. The standard location manager provides
an opportunity to run in background, since it sends a message whenever
the location changes or the accuracy improves.
The handler that receives this message will be executed in background: iOS
will un-freeze its context, but the application stays in background. The
handler will execute the following operations:
1. ensure that at most one instance of this handler is running at any
time;
2. signal a survival background task, its expiration handler will ensure
that the appropriate location manager is enabled;
3. stop the location manager from notifying changes, in order to preserve
battery;
4. save the current geolocation;
5. if at least one trigger is enabled launch a work cycle in a new thread;
6. if continuous mode is enabled or spontaneous analysis are disabled
re-enable the appropriate location manager and stop;
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM STRUCTURE 45
7. wait until there are x seconds since the last execution of this handler;
8. enable the appropriate location manager and stop.
3.3 Tracerouter module: a parallel traceroute
analysis in restricted environments
The Tracerouter analysis module provides a traceroute analysis. I devel-
oped an enhanced Parallel MDA (PMDA) which remains fully operative in
unprivileged and restricted environments.
There are many challenges to overcome:
1. This analysis must support multiple protocols, namely ICMP and
UDP. An high modularity is required to achieve this result; this mod-
ularity is provided by the introduction of generic probes, described
in subsection 3.3.1, which specify the content of a probe in a protocol-
independent fashion.
2. It must be designed to switch easily to IPv611; IP versions and pro-
tocols must be easily interchangeable. This, again, is achieved by the
generic probes, and by using the IPAddress interface introduced in
subsection 3.2.1.
3. Parallel execution with multiple threads to speed up its execution.
This requires a special synchronization technique named safeguard
introduced in subsection 3.3.3.
4. It must be able to bypass NAPTs. This requires the ability to predict
how a NAPT router will modify a probe's ﬁeld; this method is known
as NAPT bypass and is described in subsection 3.3.7.
5. It must provide an eﬃcient dealiasing technique, which doesn't require
the transmission of additional probes. This is achieved by using a
slightly modiﬁed version of MIDAR, and by saving all the relevant
dealiasing information contained in every single answer in the so-called
MIDAR database. The dealiasing mechanism is deﬁned in .
11IPv6 is not supported in this work, but is recognized as a future work.
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6. It must work in a restricted environment, without the help of raw
sockets. This imposes additional limits on the usage of the selected
protocol. All the considerations made in the following pages account
for this requirement.12
A tracerouter analysis has a well-deﬁned iter, articulated in three steps:
Initialization apply the default settings and then those speciﬁed by the
server, and then detect the IP of the phone's default gateway.
PMDA concurrently discovers new links, updating the MIDAR database
in the progress; falls back to sequential MDA when needed and for
the shortest amount of time possible.
Dealiasing use MIDAR to group interfaces of the same router together.
The algorithm described in section 2.3 can be adapted to run in a multiple
thread; before going into details I will ﬁrst introduce a few concepts and
mechanisms that are widely used in this analysis.
3.3.1 Generic probe
A generic probe is an abstraction of a probe that is used during the tracer-
oute process, in order to support both ICMP and UDP analysis methods
in a seamless fashion. Such probes store a (generic) ﬂow ID and some aux-
iliary information. Generic probes are created during an analysis, but they
are specialized into the chosen analysis and network protocols before being
sent.
The ﬂow ID is composed of six ﬁelds:
Protocol a byte, corresponding to the IPv4 protocol ﬁeld or the IPv6 Next
Header ﬁeld.
ToS (Type of Service) a byte, corresponding to the IPv4 ToS ﬁeld or to
the IPv6 Traﬃc Class ﬁeld.
12This is especially true for all considerations about a possible Android implementa-
tion.
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IP addresses source and destination IPv4/6 addresses.
First word the ﬁrst two bytes of the IP payload: ICMP Type & Code
ﬁelds or UDP source port.
Second word the third and fourth bytes of the IP payload: ICMP check-
sum or UDP destination port.
This information is not enough to send a traceroute probe. A generic probe
stores some additional auxiliary ﬁelds:
TTL a byte, corresponding to the IPv4 Time to Live or IPv6 Hop Count
ﬁelds.
Target Address IP address, either v4 or v6, that the probe is supposed to
reach. This value supports our PMDA implementation, but it won't
be copied in any ﬁeld of the IP header. Please note that this is not
the same thing as the destination IP address.
SN (Sequence Number) two bytes that ideally uniquely identify a probe
and its answer. It's ICMP SeqNum ﬁeld or UDP Checksum ﬁeld.
The ICMP implementation requires that the checksum won't change even if
we modify the SeqNum ﬁeld. This can be achieved by modifying the ICMP
identiﬁcation ﬁeld to a SN-dependent value that will always produce the
same checksum. Since it's not possible to reproduce the value 216 − 1, this
checksum won't be used by the Tracerouter module as part of the ﬂow
ID13. Please note that a port to an Android device with a 2.6 kernel version
cannot use ICMP socket, so this protocol is not available.
The UDP implementation requires that the checksum can be ﬁxed to an
arbitrary value but 216 − 1, as per above. The source ports cannot be
changed, and the length ﬁeld value cannot be controlled; the only way to
control the checksum is to add a two byte payload.
Both ICMP and UDP use the same checksum algorithm to protect data;
here it is:
13It's impossible to have the word-by-word sum equal to zero, which is the only value
that can generate 216 − 1.
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1. Let S be a 4 bytes unsigned integer, initialized to 0.
2. Initialize the checksum value to 0.
3. Read the protected data 2 bytes at a time (using 0 as padding if
necessary) and sum this word to S.
4. Until S < 216 then let S be the sum of its most signiﬁcant word and
its less signiﬁcant word.14
5. NOT (S) is the checksum.
[24] proposes optimized evaluation methods.
ICMP checksum covers the ICMP packet's header and payload. We are
interested in keeping the checksum ﬁxed to second, in setting SeqNum to
SN and not having any payload. Therefore we can use the ICMP Identiﬁ-
cation ﬁeld to manipulate the checksum, as the pseudo-code in 3.2 shows,
assuming that the initial ID value is 0.
Listing 3.2: ICMP Identiﬁcation ﬁeld evaluation
1 word cur rent = evaluateICMPChecksum ( probe ) ;
2 word de s i r ed = probe . second ;
3 word invc = ~cur rent ;
4 word invd = ~de s i r ed ;
5
6 word ID = invd −invc −( invd < invc ) ;
UDP checksum covers the whole UDP packet plus the pseudo-header, which
is composed of the IP source and destination address, the IP Protocol ﬁeld
value and the payload length. The pseudo-code in listing 3.3 shows how to
evaluate the correct payload value to ﬁx a chosen checksum.
Listing 3.3: UDP payload evaluation
1 word cur rent = evaluateUDPChecksum ( probe ) ;
2 word de s i r ed = probe . sn ;
3 word invc = ~cur rent ;
4 word invd = ~de s i r ed ;
14This implies that 216− 1+x, x ∈ N+ becomes x, therefore it's impossible to obtain
0.
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5
6 word payload = networkOrder ( invd −invc −( invd < invc ) )
;
In line 6 of both listings we have:
invc− invd− x mod 216
where:
x =
{
1 invd < invc
0 invd ≥ invc
x counters for the one's complement sum eﬀect that veriﬁes if the inverted
current checksum is greater than the desired. Be it so, the payload must
be big enough to cause a wrap around in the checksum evaluation or, in
this case, it will add 1 to the most signiﬁcant word of the 4 byte counter.
This means that there would be a +1 added to the 2 byte checksum value
before complementing, so it would assume the value invd + 1. x counters
this eﬀect.
3.3.2 Probe-answer couplings
An answer is deﬁned as a notiﬁcation triggered by a certain probe. Pairing
correctly an answer to its originating probe in a parallel environment is
both crucial and challenging; this operation is deﬁned as coupling. Incorrect
coupling will surely corrupt the inferred topology.
We can identify two coupling methods:
Time coupling there is only one probe that it's waiting for its answer at
a time. This means that the ﬁrst answer received should be assigned
to that probe.
SN coupling an answer, which usually stores a portion of the generating
probe including its SN, is assigned to the probe that has the same SN.
They both have pitfall:
• time coupling cannot be used in a parallel environment by deﬁnition;
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• time coupling could be poisoned if a stray notiﬁcation of a previous
probe reaches the phone;
• SN coupling might fail for a number of reasons:
 a stray notiﬁcation can again poison this coupling method;
 some routers do not include the originating packet header in the
notiﬁcation payload;
 some router might even alter the notiﬁcation payload;
 the probe crossed a NA(P)T.
Stray notiﬁcations are, at a ﬁrst glance, troublesome, because there isn't
nothing that we can do to ignore their eﬀect. Still, they are rare events and
we can go further using a shared, increasing SN counter to generate
these values: since SNs are stored in two bytes, there can be 216 of them.
The counter might do a wrap around during an analysis, but it will take
enough time so that the IP protocol will have already dropped roaming
notiﬁcations (they too, of course, must adhere to the TTL logic).
When routers alter the notiﬁcation payload, only time coupling can be used.
When using UDP with ﬁxed destination mode, a diﬀerent coupling can be
used:
Port coupling there is only one probe that it's waiting for its answer
at a time for a certain UDP destination port. This means that the
ﬁrst answer received should be assigned to the only probe with that
destination port. This method cannot be used in conjunction with a
varying destination method.
It limits the degree of parallelism achievable, but in turn oﬀers a much
easier way to cope with NAPT. This should be used only when necessary,
since time coupling allows for faster executions. A positive eﬀect of this
method is that it nulliﬁes NAPT eﬀects, as seen in subsection 3.3.7.
This coupling method is critical for a parallel implementation of MDA in
Android platform previous to version 4.0, precisely all the devices with a
2.6 kernel. They all lack ICMP support, so they cannot use ICMP socket
to receive notiﬁcation, but they are forced to rely on SOCKERROR. This
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method does not provide access to the UDP checksum, so it is not possible
to implement SN coupling. These device cannot provide a parallel MDA
analysis with varying destination.
Answer Dispatcher and SN reservation
Sequence Numbers are mainly created using a shared counter and a generic
probe stores only one of them. The Answer Dispatcher entity is used to
control which SNs can be used, and it couples notiﬁcations to the corre-
sponding probe. When a thread creates a probe, it register the generated
SN to the Answer Dispatcher: this operation is called SN reservation. If a
SN is not available, the thread will generate a new one until it surrenders
(after a predetermined number of retries) or until it succeeds.
A SN reservation associates a SN to a probe. Only one probe can use a
SN at a time, but a thread might reserve more than one SN for the same
probe.
3.3.3 Sending, receiving and safeguard mechanism
To send a probe, a sender thread extract from a shared counter a sequence
number and it will register it to Answer Dispatcher; after this reservation, it
can ﬁnally send the probe. After getting the current system time, it will wait
on a private semaphore, linked to its reservation with Answer Dispatcher.
This wait has a tunable timeout, so a thread doesn't wait forever for a
notiﬁcation that might never come.
Receiving notiﬁcations is accomplished by using an ICMP socket; a sin-
gle thread, the receiver thread, is allowed to operate on it. The receiver
thread will use sequence number coupling to dispatch every incoming notiﬁ-
cation, using Answer Dispatcher. After receiving a notiﬁcation, the receiver
thread will immediately store the system time in the Answer object.
When the receiving thread can't dispatch an answer, it will raise a safeguard
needed ﬂag and it will drop the answer. At least one sender will timeout.
A sender reacts to this event by queuing for a safeguard send (or safesend).
in the so-called safeguard queue. A sender in this queue is denoted as safe
sender. The safeguard rules are the following:
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• the safeguard needed ﬂag can be raised only if there are senders wait-
ing for an answer, thus preventing stray answers to trigger the safe-
guard;
• when a thread tries to send a probe, the safeguard will freeze it if the
ﬂag is up and there is at least one thread in the safeguard queue;
• the safeguard queue will release a safe sender at a time only when no
other thread is sending, safeguard or not;
• the last thread leaving the safeguard queue will lower the safeguard
needed ﬂag.
This mechanism allows for non-continuous parallel execution, using SN cou-
pling by default, falling back to time coupling only when it's necessary.
When an answer is dispatched, the corresponding sending thread will wake
up. It will therefore compute the round trip time of the probe and it will
store it in the answer, along with the transmission time.
When using UDP with ﬁxed destination and a NAPT device has been
discovered, each port has its thread queue to guarantee mutual exclusion.
More precisely, this is the implementation of port coupling.
3.3.4 Retransmission mechanism and TTL skipping
A sender thread has a ﬁnite number of retries available, that allows it to
resend a probe which didn't receive any answer. A not-working node is not
the only cause to a sender thread not receiving any answer to a speciﬁc
probe: some routers might operate correctly without emitting any notiﬁca-
tion. Such routers will truncate an MDA branch, reducing the amount of
topological information that can be inferred.
TTL skipping changes this behavior: a sender might increase the probe's
TTL and restart the send procedure again. TTL skipping has four param-
eters that deﬁnes its behavior. TTL skipping is enabled by default, but
the server might disable it, or it might even tune its parameters. These
parameters are:
Max Initial Bonus the maximum TTL increment that can be used when
detecting the gateway;
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Max Vertical Bonus the maximum TTL increment that can be used
when detecting regular nodes;
TTL Token Limit maximum number of tokens at a time;
TTL Token Reﬁll amount of tokens added after a node discovery.
When discovering nodes other than the gateway, a token mechanism is used.
Tokens are stored in a dispenser which has a maximum capacity and a reﬁll
ratio as mentioned above. When a thread wants to increase its probe's TTL
it fetches a token from the dispenser, with respect to Max Vertical Bonus.
If there are no more tokens, or if the bonus limit has been reached, the
thread will close that MDA branch.
3.3.5 Topology graph
The outcome of a traceroute analysis is a graph. The algorithm, during the
ﬁrst two phases, creates links between interfaces. During these two phases,
the graph nodes are interfaces that produced a notiﬁcation15; the edges are
not links between the known interfaces, though. With a traceroute analysis
it's not possible to discover what's the interface that does not produce a
notiﬁcation, therefore edges are links between an interface node and an
interface.
A node stores diﬀerent information:
• the IP address of the interface it represents;
• the router ID16 of the interface, which defaults to −1;
• the list of outgoing edges;
• the list of incoming edges.
A router ID is an integer number that groups nodes into routers. A value
of −1 indicates that interface is to be considered as a per-se router. If
two nodes have the same value k ≥ 0 then the router k has two interfaces.
15With the notable exception of node 0, which is always the iPhone and always has
IP address 0.0.0.0.
16This has nothing to do with router ID as seen in many routing protocols.
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It's important to note that nodes cannot hold information about round trip
times, since there might be diﬀerent paths that could reach that node; RTT
is not an information that depends uniquely on the node position, but also
depends on the path two packet takes to complete the round trip.
A link stores the following information:
• the IP address of the two interfaces that it's connecting:
 the target IP address is the IP address of the interface that pro-
duced the notiﬁcation;
 the precursor IP address is the IP address of the interface that
preceded the target interface during its discovery;
• the link's delay, in milliseconds;
• a TTL skip value.
The TTL skip value is a positive integer that indicates how many fake nodes
are between the two nodes. This value defaults to zero, but there are three
diﬀerent events that might change it to something diﬀerent:
1. the TTL skipping mechanism increased the probe's TTL - the skip
value would be the TTL increment used;
2. an incoming notiﬁcation had in its inner IP header a TTL value to 0,
indicating a zero-forwarding router - the skip value would be 1.
The ﬁrst method is common practice in almost all traceroute implementa-
tion. The second method could not be tested since I never got access to a
router that I was 100% sure it was a zero forwarder, although this method
has been already proposed in [20].
3.3.6 Traceroute algorithm's phases
As already mentioned before, the traceroute procedure is composed of three
main phases: initialization, Parallel MDA and dealiasing.
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM STRUCTURE 55
Initialization
The main thread17 load settings from memory, and it will then override
them with server-speciﬁed settings. It will then discover the phone's IP
address of the interface that will support the analysis.
Next, it will start the send-receive mechanism, initializing the receiver
thread. It will then craft a probe with a random ﬂow ID, that will pro-
vide a basis for the rest of the procedure. The probe is sent with TTL set
to 1, in order to discover the default gateway; if enabled, TTL skipping
might be used.
It will then create an horizontal explorer (HE) thread for the just-
discovered node. An HE thread coordinates the exploration from a node,
identiﬁed by the probe who reached it. The probe stores this information
in his target ﬁeld. It also stores the path such probe crossed.
The initialization phase is concluded. The main thread will wait until there
are no more horizontal explores; then it will enter the dealiasing phase.
Until then, the algorithm moves to the parallel MDA phase.
Parallel MDA
This phases deﬁnes the behavior of HE threads. There are also vertical
explorer (VE) threads, generated by a HE, which discover new links using
a copy of the HE's probe.
Let's deﬁne two numbers: W, the exploration increment, and L, the ex-
ploration limit. These numbers control MDA's conﬁdence level. An HE
creates a Target Generator and a Target Dispatcher objects, that will con-
trol how each probe is changed by a VE. These objects can be conﬁgured
to implement MDA's ﬁxed and varying destination policies. Target Gener-
ator modiﬁes the destination IP address, if needed, while Target Dispatcher
guarantees that at most L vertical explorers will be created, and it will also
assign to each explorer a diﬀerent IP destination address, again, if needed.
An HE creates W vertical explorers; it will then wait until there are no
more VE created, directly or not, by him.
A vertical explorer will execute the following operations, in order:
17The main thread would be the thread that actually starts the traceroute analysis.
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1. submits its probe to the Target Dispatcher, which will change the
ﬂow ID according to the selected MDA policy or it will deny the VE's
execution, killing it;
2. it sends the modiﬁed probe without changing its TTL, to verify if it
reaches the HE's node: if not, it will stop;
3. it increases TTL by one;
4. it sends the modiﬁed probe to discover a new interface, optionally
using the TTL skipping mechanism;
5. if it receives an answer, a subset of this information is stored in MI-
DAR database;
6. if it discovers a link to an new interface, it launches a new batch of
W vertical explorers and it will make the just received Answer to its
horizontal explorer.
The HE receives a set of Answers from its sibling. After eliminating du-
plicates and invalid links (loops, links to invalid addresses), it updates the
graph by adding a link to a newly-created node for each answer. It then
starts a new HE thread for each node, with an updated probe and path.
An HE won't analyse a node if it's already been analysed, therefore a list of
all the already explored nodes is kept. The server can specify an exclusion
list; it's a list of IP address that the server is not interested into. If a
HE detects a link to an IP in the exclusion list, it will completely stop the
analysis. Nevertheless, the client will still send the inferred data to the
server, that will then choose what to do with it.
When all the HE ﬁnish, the main thread wakes up and starts the last phase,
dealiasing.
Dealiasing
This last phase uses data collected during the other two phases. In fact,
each time a sender thread receives an Answer it creates aMIDAR answer
object, a subset of a regular Answer. It contains:
• the IP ID value, found in the IPv4 header;
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• the computed round trip time;
• its timestamp, the arrival time of the answer.
This object is then inserted in the MIDAR database. This database is,
simply put, an associative map that assign a set of MIDAR answers to an
IP address. Therefore, a sender thread will insert the answer in the set
corresponding to the IP address that sent it.
Suppose the inferred topology graph has N nodes, and that each node can
be identiﬁed by a number i ∈ N, where 0 ≤ i < N . The main thread creates
a N ×N reachability matrix R from the graph. The generic element Rji at
row i and column j is either 1, if node i can reach node j, or 0, if otherwise.
Computing this matrix is very useful to avoid merging interface that cannot
belong to the same router.
In section 2.4 I've described the monotonic test between two time series
extracted from two diﬀerent sets of MIDAR answers. Let's represent a
router A as a set of IP addresses. A router will have a total time series
obtained by merging all the time series of each interface it has.
The algorithm is composed of the following steps:
1. for each interface, create a router with the interface's IP address as
its sole element.
2. for every possible pair of routers (A, B):
a) if ∃ i ∈ A, j ∈ B : Rji = 1ORRij = 1 then do not merge this
pair.
b) if the monotonic test over the total time series of A and B passes,
then merge the two routers together:
AB = A ∪B
otherwise do not merge this pair.
This algorithm stops when there is only one router or when all the possible
combinations fail. To avoid running the monotonic test multiple time, a
subtly diﬀerent approach can be used:
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1 r ou t e r s = [ l i s t o f route r s , l ength N]
2
3 for i in 0 to l ength ( r ou t e r s ) :
4 j = i +1
5 while j < N:
6 i f [ i and j notConnected ] and monotonicTest (
r ou t e r s [ i ] , r ou t e r s [ j ] ) :
7 r ou t e r s [ i ] = rou t e r s [ i ] + rou t e r s [ j ]
8 r ou t e r s . d e l e t e ( j )
9 else :
10 j = j +1;
Using this algorithm only one test per pair is executed. After all routers
have been identiﬁed, each node's router ID is set to the router number it
belongs to.
MIDAR can be implemented only on Android devices that sport a 3.0 kernel
or greater, since all the required information used in the dealiasing process
can only be obtained via ICMP notiﬁcations, which are not accessible with-
out ICMP sockets.
3.3.7 NAPT bypass
NATs18 introduce variations in the source IP address: they replace private
address (from a private, internal network) with a public address, extracted
from a pool[25]. An outgoing packet therefore has a diﬀerent IP source
address before and after the NAT. This actually means that everything
that depends on the source address will be altered. This IP address will
be the same for all the duration of the analysis, therefore this behavior
allows for the ﬂow ID to be constant, just not the same in the two domains.
When an incoming packet is being sent to an address in the NAT pool, its
destination IP address will be changed to the corresponding private address
and the packet will be forwarded to the correct host.
A ICMP-based tracerouter tries to keep the ICMP checksum ﬁeld constant,
and identiﬁes probes using the SeqNum ﬁeld. None of these ﬁelds are altered
18Network Address Translator, device that translate IP addresses with a one-to-one
relationship from internal and external addresses.
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by NATs, so the probe contained in its corresponding notiﬁcation will have
the same values in these important ﬁelds.
NAT has a destructive eﬀect on UDP traceroute: the router modiﬁes the
source address, which concurs in UDP checksum. A NAT router must
therefore recompute the UDP checksum and replace the original with the
new, modiﬁed one. When a notiﬁcation comes back, the NAT router cannot
recover the correct checksum value in UDP. UDP-based tracerouter uses
the checksum as a sequence number while operating in UDP, therefore the
standard mechanism won't be able to assign notiﬁcations to probes.
A ﬂexible way to solve this issue requires the knowledge of the device's
public IP address. There are two ways to achieve this goal:
• use a UPNP message to discover the router's public IP;
• the server sends this information back to the client when assigning a
job.
Using UPNP is faster and somehow more reliable, since this operation can
be repeated each time an analysis starts. This method is implemented in
mYriadi but it's completely disabled, since only a few routers oﬀers UPNP
support and have it on by default. mYriadi uses the second method, which
cannot be repeated. A traceroute job is not validated if it's old enough,
since this IP address might have been changed.
Once the public IP address is known, it's trivial to compute the value of
this checksum in the public network. Each UDP probe will be registered
to two diﬀerent sequence numbers: the regular checksum and the external
checksum.
NAPTs19 are even more destructive: they not only change the IP source
address but also the transport-level source port. [26] ﬁrst introduces the
NAPT term; the process is also known as PAT20 and IP masquerading.
Let's consider a NAPT which only has one public IP address available for
translation; a NAPT will then create a mapping between a private source
port and a public source port; this binding will last some time, according
to whichever policy the device is using. As shown before, we can compute
19Also known as PAT, Port Address Translation.
20Port Address Translation.
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what the checksum would be outside the private network. Each time a
thread sends a probe and fails, if at least an unknown notiﬁcation is received
safeguard will be triggered. Each safe send operation will be extended to
detect which public source port the router has assigned to the private source
port.
Suppose that a safe sender received an answer. This thread will then check
if the checksum is one of those two it would expect behind a NAT. If they
diﬀer, then the thread will compute:
∆ = Checksum− Checksumest
We are expecting a single mismatch, localized in the source port ﬁeld.
Therefore, the new port would be:
new = old+ ∆ mod 216
or:
new = old+ ∆ + 1 mod 216
We cannot tell which one it is: the last phase of the checksum introduces
this indetermination due to one-complement sum.
We can compute two more values of checksum, so an UDP probe can be
identiﬁed with up to four sequence numbers.
In a varying destination analysis, the source port will always be the same,
therefore we must compute ∆ at most L times, where L is the exploration
limit - we will use at most L diﬀerent IP destination addresses.
In a ﬁxed destination analysis, the source port will be diﬀerent between
vertical explorers. Using the delta mechanism would introduce a much
higher number of safesends, since almost all port can be used at least once
and there is no guarantee that the NAPT will maintain a binding for all
the duration of the analysis, especially because the analysis will hog the
NAPT pool. To achieve better results, if a NAPT is detected PMDA uses
port coupling and destination port queues.
3.3.8 Analysis example
In this subsection I will describe the operations that a clients executes
when running a traceroute analysis. Assume that the server gave a client
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a tracerouter job to the address G with UDP and ﬁxed destination; all the
other parameters are set to their default. The tracerouter's main thread
discovers its IP address and the default gateway's one, using a randomly
created probe. It then starts an HE over the newly-found node, shown in
red in ﬁgure 3.5. The newly-created HE carries the initial probe used to
discover the default gateway.
Default gateway
A B C
iPhone
Figure 3.5: analysis example, ﬁrst step
Let's suppose there are three nodes after the default gateway yet to be
discovered. The HE launches a ﬁrst batch of six VE, as in ﬁgure 3.6; the
edge labels list which probe actually discovered which node. Each probe
has a diﬀerent ﬂow ID, and is launched by a separate VE. Please note that,
if the default gateway acts as a NAPT, we won't be able to send multiple
probes with the same destination port at a time. If we were using a varying
destination approach, the ﬁrst transmission of each probe would have failed
to evaluate ∆.
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Default gateway
A
1, 2, 3, 5
B
4, 6
C
iPhone
Figure 3.6: analysis example, second step
Nodes A and B were discovered, so MDA will spawn 12 other VEs. They
will eventually reach C, as in ﬁgure 3.7.
Default gateway
A
1
B
4
C
14
iPhone
Figure 3.7: analysis example, second step completed
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A total of 24 VE were launched for default gateway. Even if most probes
reached already-known nodes to reach the 95% conﬁdence level, their an-
swers are still useful since they contribute to MIDAR DB. The HE will then
ﬁlter the received data and create a new HE for each discovered node, as in
ﬁgure 3.8:
• node A's HE will be created with path iPhone→ gateway → A with
probe 1 (red);
• node B's HE will be created with path iPhone→ gateway → B with
probe 4 (blue);
• node C's HE will be created with path iPhone→ gateway → C with
probe 14 (green).
Figure 3.8: analysis example, third step
The three HE operate all at the same time: they will discover both D
and E. Suppose B ﬁnishes before A and C; two new HE would be created,
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since D and E are unknown nodes. Node D's HE will be created with path
iPhone→ gateway → B → D, in purple; node D's HE will be created with
path iPhone → gateway → B → E, in blue. They both inherit a probe
from B's HE.
In ﬁgure 3.9, there are four active HEs: A, C, D and E.
Figure 3.9: analysis example, fourth step
When A and C horizontal explorers ﬁnish, they won't start any additional
explorer, since they have been already explored, or are being explored right
now. One HE between E's and D's will ﬁnish before the other and will
create the HE to F, which will lead us to the full inferred interface topology
as in ﬁgure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10: analysis example, full interface topology
MIDAR ﬁrst builds the reachability matrix in table 3.1.
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iPhone gateway A B C D E F G
iPhone 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
gateway 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
B 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
C 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
G 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3.1: analysis example, reachability matrix
The bold values show that A, B and C are not connected. Suppose that for
each of them there are 8 MIDAR answers21. MIDAR will run the monotonic
test between A and B ﬁrst, using ﬁctitious data22 from tables 3.2 and 3.3:
Time (relative) [ms] RTT [ms] IP ID
0 2 56
6 3 65
7 1 69
9 3 74
13 4 81
15 1 86
19 2 96
21 1 102
Table 3.2: MIDAR answers for A
21They actually are a lot more: each VE starting from one of them will ﬁrst create a
probe that should reach them.
22The values reported for Time and RTT are not real, but their distribution is.
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM STRUCTURE 67
Time (relative) [ms] RTT [ms] IP ID
2 3 59
6 1 67
8 2 68
10 1 73
14 2 84
16 3 88
22 2 89
23 3 106
Table 3.3: MIDAR answers for B
MIDAR monotonic test will then be run between A and B, A and C and
then B and C. If a merge occurs between A and B, then it would run the
test between (A, B) and C. If there is a merge between A and C MIDAR
won't run a test with AC and B, since it already knows that A and B are
not compatible.
With the time series provided A and B can and will be merged into the
same router. I'll skip the following step of running the monotonic test
between (A, B) and C, assuming that has been passed. The ﬁnal topology
is reported in ﬁgure 3.11.
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Figure 3.11: analysis example, topology after dealiasing
3.4 Client-server protocol
mYriadi client-server protocol implements the following features:
• clients service requests to the server;
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• server notiﬁcation that a client is available to run an analysis, and
subsequently assignment of a job to such client;
• clients analyses results delivery to server;
• client identiﬁcation.
This protocol has a modular structure, therefore enabling eﬀortless future
expansions to accommodate new analyses and operations.
Every implementation of this protocol must adhere to the following conven-
tions:
• network order (big endian) must be enforced whenever applicable;
• the protocol is designed to run over TCP;
• a ﬂoating point value Vf is never transmitted as-is, instead it is always
transmitted as a 32 bit integer Vi:
Vi =
⌊
Vf 10
4
⌋
In the following pages, this is called decimal representation of a
ﬂoating point number.
In this document, byteﬁelds, a particular kind of diagram, are used to show
the protocol's data structure and ordering. Grey-colored padding boxes are
used to improve the readability of such diagrams: they must be ignored
when implementing the protocol.
3.4.1 Identiﬁers
The protocol uses four diﬀerent identiﬁers:
CID Client ID; it identiﬁes a particular client between many. A CID is a
4 byte unsigned integer.
OID Operation ID; it represents a particular operation that the client
wants to do, or a particular service that the client would like to receive
from the server. An OID is a 1 byte unsigned integer.
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AID Analysis ID; it discriminates between all the possible analyses MapLi-
brary (the client-side library) supports. An AID is a 1 byte unsigned
integer.
JID Job ID; it is an identiﬁer linked to a particular job assigned to a client.
A job is an instance of an analysis assigned to a particular client. The
server generates a JID for each job assigned to every client. A JID is
a 8 byte unsigned integer. JID namespace is shared between all the
analysis IDs.
Table 3.4 summarizes their size and usage.
Id Size (B) Identiﬁed entities
CID 4 Clients
OID 1 Operations (service requests typologies)
AID 1 Analyses
JID 8 Job
Table 3.4: protocol identiﬁers
3.4.2 Establishing protocol sessions
A client must run a session establishment procedure with the server:
• The client sends its CID to the server and waits for approval.
• The server acks with a 1 byte unsigned integer that must be either 1,
allowed, or 0, refused.
After session establishment, the client can send can communicate an oper-
ation to the server. An operation may or may not close the session; that
is, if the client wish to communicate another operation it must run the
aforementioned session establishment procedure.
3.4.3 Operations
Each operation represents a speciﬁc request of the client to the server; an
operation may have one or more parameters. table 3.5 lists the operations
deﬁned.
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OID Operation
0 Refresh status
1 Ask for a job
2 Send results
3 Geo-locate an IPv4
4 Geo-locate an IPv6
Table 3.5: OID to Operation
Refresh status
A client performs this operation to refresh its status, sending to the server
its location as parameters.
As in table 3.6, the client must send the OID 0, followed by the decimal
representation of latitude and longitude, in this order.
08162431
OID = 0
Latitude
Longitude
Table 3.6: Refresh status client message
There is no further interaction between client and server.
Ask for a job
With this operation, the client request a job to the server: the client per-
forms this operation when it's ready to run an analysis. This operation
requires two parameters, latitude and longitude. The client must send the
OID 1, followed by the decimal representation of latitude and longitude, in
this order.
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08162431
OID = 1
Latitude
Longitude
Table 3.7: Ask for a job client message
The server answers with an AID and, if applicable, a JID. Depending on
the AID, the server might send additional data. If AID is set to 0, the client
hasn't been assigned any job.
08162431
AID
If AID is not 0:
JID
Parameters
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hhh
Table 3.8: Ask for a job server full message
Send results
A client sends the results of a job to the server; the job's JID is the unique
parameter of this operation.
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08162431
OID = 2
JID
If JID is valid:
Serialized data
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hhhh
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hhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hhh
Table 3.9: Send results client full message
This operation is composed by the following steps:
1. the client sends the OID (2) and the JID;
2. the server validates the JID and will send a byte with the following
semantic:
0 the JID is not valid;
1 the JID is valid;
3. if the JID is not valid, the client will close the connection and it won't
try to send those result anymore;
4. if the JID is valid, the client sends the results to the server, with the
data serialization format speciﬁed by the analysis type;
5. the server validates the data received, and then it sends back an out-
come byte, according to table 3.10;
6. if the client won't receive such outcome byte, it may try to retransmit
data again, at its own discretion, but in a new protocol session;
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7. if the client receives the outcome byte, it will behave accordingly to
table 3.10; if a retransmission is needed, it must be performed in a
new protocol session.
Value Description Delete saved data
0 validation failure yes
1 validation success yes
2 retransmission required no
Table 3.10: outcome byte values
Geo-locate an IPv4/v6 address
A client asks the server to geo-locate an IP address. This operation has one
parameter, the IP to locate: depending on the OID, the IP protocol version
used is v4 or v6. Please refer to table 3.5.
08162431
OID = 3
IPv4
08162431
OID = 4
IPv6
Table 3.11: Geo-location request client full message
The server sends back the decimal representation of latitude and longitude,
in this order.
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08162431
Latitude
Longitude
Table 3.12: Geo-location answer full message
Should the server fail to geolocate such address, it will send the maximum
value for a 4 byte integer, instead of the coordinates. To handle this out-
come, the client must ﬁrst read the latitude:if its value is out of range23 the
client infers that the server couldn't locate the requested address.
3.4.4 Analyses
Table 3.13 lists the jobs deﬁned in this platform version.
AID Analysis
0 No analysis
1 Traceroute
Table 3.13: AID to Analysis
Traceroute
This analysis, identiﬁed by AID 1, consists of a traceroute toward a target
IP address; the traceroute will stop if it ﬁnds an IP in an exclusion list. A
number of parameters might be forced by the server to the client. To be
as ﬂexible as possible, parameters are sent using a TLV24 blueprint. The
server must send the size in byte of the parameters, in a 2 byte unsigned
integer.
23Latitude is constrained to 90 degrees, therefore latitude ≤ 90 104.
24Type Length Value.
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08162431
AID = 1
JID
Parameters size
Parameter
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh
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...
Parameter
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
List
Table 3.14: Traceroute job assignment
A parameter is characterized, in order, by:
1. a type code, encoded in an unsigned byte;
2. data length, encoded in an unsigned byte;
3. the data itself.
Some parameters are optional, whilst others are mandatory:
• if the client doesn't ﬁnd an optional parameter, it will default to a
certain value or behavior;
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• if the client doesn't ﬁnd a mandatory parameter, it will refuse the job.
The server can send the parameters in whatever order it prefers. The server
may send more than one instance per parameter type; unless speciﬁed, the
client will always ignore any repetition of a parameter type. This might be
useful for future expansions.
The following is a list of all supported parameters:
Target [Type 0, mandatory] speciﬁes the target IP address; length can be
either 4 or 16, in order to support both IPv4 and IPv6.
Probe type [Type 1] speciﬁes the probe type: the ﬁrst byte in the payload
selects the protocol used.
ICMP default, identiﬁed by 0, doesn't need additional parameters
- length must be 1.
UDP identiﬁed by 1, needs the client's IP address; length must be
either 5 (IPv4) or 17 (IPv6).
Exclusion list [Type 2] contains a list of IP address that, if encountered,
will trigger the stop of the analysis; the number of addresses can be
recovered by dividing the length ﬁeld value with the size of an IP
address in byte. If missing, the list is considered empty.
Max TTL [Type 3] speciﬁed the maximum TTL value that can be used
by the client, as an unsigned byte; length is always 1.
Exploration mode [Type 4] describes the behavior of the client when
exploring nodes. The following ﬁelds are sent:
Mode [1 unsigned byte] if 0 the client won't modify the destination
address. Default is 1.
Exploration limit [1 unsigned byte] the maximum number of probes
that can be sent to discover the next hop of a node. Default is
96.
Exploration increment [1 unsigned byte] the number of vertical
exploration that will be performed on a node the ﬁrst time it's
discovered, or after a new outgoing interface is discovered. De-
fault is 6.
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The client will send the outcome even if the traceroute stopped for any
reason: the server will then accept or reject the outcome as deﬁned.
Graph serialization The topology is represented as a list of edges be-
tween nodes. A node is identiﬁed by a 2 byte integer alias: if this alias is
negative, the node is fake, otherwise is real. A fake node is a node indi-
rectly detected by the traceroute analysis: its existence is inferred from the
network behavior.
A generic edge is composed of:
• source and destination real node aliases;
• the source and destination IP addresses;
• the delay of the link;
• the TTL skip count: if h is the TTL value that reaches the source
node, and k is the TTL value that reaches the destination node, then
the TTL skip value t is:
t = k − h− 1
this value represents the hypothetical number of hidden nodes that
are between the source and the destination that the traceroute failed
to detect explicitly.
A 1-hop edge is composed of:
• source and destination node aliases, without restrictions on fakeness ;
• if the source alias is real:
 the source IP address;
• if the destination alias is real:
 the destination IP addresses;
• in addition, if both aliases are real:
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 the delay of the link.
The TTL skip count is absent, since it's always assumed to be 0. Therefore,
a 1-hop edge has no hidden nodes in between. table 3.15 shows the data
format of a 1-hop edge - clients must adhere to the ﬁeld order speciﬁed.
08162431
Source alias Destination alias
Destination IP
Source IP
Delay
Opt.
Table 3.15: 1-hop edge serialization with IPv4
Before client-side serialization, the graph has generic edges only. It is free
of fake nodes, but there might be hidden nodes, implied by non-zero TTL
skip count occurrences. The data representation of the graph must be
expressed as a list of serialized 1-hop edges: the client must transform the
graph representation in order to use only 1-hop edges. For each generic
edge from A to B, from IP X to IP Y, with delay D and TTL skip count
T, the client will create T fake nodes, and will create T − 1 1-hop edges
that will connect A with B, passing through each fake node once.
The client will send the result of the analysis as in table 3.16, keeping in
mind that 1-hop edges have variable size:
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08162431
Advertised size (double words)
Number of real nodes Number of fake nodes
Timestamp delta
1-hop edge
...
1-hop edge
 list
Table 3.16: Traceroute results structure
Assuming that the client ﬁnished the analysis at TF , the client creates the
timestamp delta ∆T from the timestamp when it received the job TS:
∆T = TF − TS
The client sends the advertised size Sa in double words instead of the num-
ber of edges. This has the following consequences:
• since edges have diﬀerent size depending on their content, the server
doesn't have to parse the data in order to decide how many bytes to
read from the TCP stream;
• the number of edges in the results cannot be identiﬁed without reading
the payload;
• the client sends the number of real and fake nodes, as two byte un-
signed integers, right after the advertised size, allowing the server to
perform an early validation.
Chapter 4
Validation
A fool is a man who never tried an experiment in his life.
Erasmus Darwin
To assure that the whole platform performs correctly, we executed a general
test that interests the whole system. Our goal was to reconstruct a map
of the GARR network. GARR is the Italian research network, which has
an high quality documentation and freely provides its ground truth, a map
that describes correctly the network's topology. This experiment, described
in section 4.1, veriﬁes both the server and the client appliances: it relies
both on the client's ability to run a traceroute analysis and on the correct
server-side logic that integrates all the topologies into one graph.
A set of four analyses is provided in 4.2; they use diﬀerent MDA modes and
their results are compared one to another to show the diﬀerence between
them.
In addition, a custom test validates the NAPT bypass method; this exper-
iment is described in section 4.3.
81
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4.1 GARR network
The GARR network (http://www.garr.it/) oﬀers access to the GARR In-
tegrated Networking Suite, also known as GINS. GINS provides various in-
formation and statistics. The backbone weathermap describes in realtime
the usage of backbone links between the various PoPs, Points of Presence.
I did not expect measurement anomalies during the analyses and, in fact,
none were found. The UDP protocol was used, altough ICMP would've
been ﬁne, too, since GARR routers behave correctly and respond to ICMP
probes. Figure 4.1 shows the backbone structure of the network.
The experiment was run in mid May 2012 from Pisa1. The device used
was connected to the IET department network, since it is attached to the
GARR network via the PI1 PoP. I handpicked 53 targets, all located at
the edges of the network. In this way I ran each analysis from an access
network to another access network, as far as possible. The intermediary
nodes and links will deﬁne the backbone when the server will merge each
graph together.
1A ﬁrst experiment was run in mid December 2011 at Pisa, from the Serra WiFi
network, with very good results, since it managed to describe the GARR backbone
correctly. The GARR network, however, experienced a lot of updates in the following
six months, so I decided to re-run the experiment to have a more up-to-date map.
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Figure 4.1: GARR network backbone weathermap via GINS
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The following list contains the campaign's targets:
PoP Domain name or description Targeted IP address
CT1
rt-ct1-ru-unirc.ct1.garr.net 193.206.137.166
rt-ct1-ru-infngrid.ct1.garr.net 193.206.137.186
rt-ct1-ru-irccs-neurolesi-me.ct1.garr.net 193.206.137.182
TS1
rc-ts1-ru-cnrismar.ts1.garr.net 193.206.132.10
rc-ts1-ru-units.ts1.garr.net 193.206.132.26
TN
rc1-tn-ru-unitn.tn.garr.net 193.206.143.98
rc-tn-ru-infntn.tn.garr.net 193.206.143.94
PI1 rt-pi1-ru-iit-ge.pi1.garr.net 193.206.132.70
PV
rc-pv-ru-cnao-pv-bk.pv.garr.net 193.204.217.86
rc-pv-ru-irccsmaug.pv.garr.net 193.206.142.178
rc-pv-ru-unipv.pv.garr.net 193.206.129.50
MI3
rt-mi3-ru-abami.mi3.garr.net 193.206.129.26
Archivio di Stato - Napoli 212.189.246.14
IRCCS FBF Brescia 212.189.242.178
PD1
rt-pd1-ru-uniud-l1.pd1.garr.net 193.204.218.106
rt-pd1-ru-cnrpd.pd1.garr.net 193.206.132.194
rt-pd1-ru-corila.pd1.garr.net 193.206.140.146
BO1
ru-ababo-rt1-bo1.bo1.garr.net 193.206.128.78
ns2.garr.net 193.206.141.41
rt1-bo1-ru-lhcopn.bo1.garr.net 193.206.128.30
NA1
rt-na1-ru-abana.na1.garr.net 193.206.130.58
rt-na1-ru-eneaportici-l1.na1.garr.net 193.204.218.130
rt-na1-ru-infnsa.na1.garr.net 193.206.143.130
AN
rc-an-ru-cnran.an.garr.net 193.204.217.218
rc-an-ru-itis.an.garr.net 193.206.140.110
UR
rc-an-rc-ur.ur.garr.net 193.206.134.238
rc-an-rc-ur-l2.ur.garr.net 193.206.134.178
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PoP Domain name or description Targeted IP address
AN
rc-an-ru-cnran.an.garr.net 193.204.217.218
rc-an-ru-itis.an.garr.net 193.206.140.110
UR
rc-an-rc-ur.ur.garr.net 193.206.134.238
rc-an-rc-ur-l2.ur.garr.net 193.206.134.178
CA
rc-ca1-ru-cybersarmons.ca1.garr.net 193.206.137.38
rc-ca1-ru-uniss.ca1.garr.net 193.206.140.78
FUC rc-fuc-ru-asifucino.fuc.garr.net 193.206.131.134
BA1 rt-ba1-ru-cnrba.ba1.garr.net 193.206.142.90
CZ rc-cz-ru-uniczmg.cz.garr.net 193.206.142.246
MT rc-mt-ru-asimt.mt.garr.net 193.206.137.122
rc-mt-ru-emsamt.mt.garr.net 193.206.137.106
MI1 lhcopn-cnaf.cern.ch 192.16.166.18
PA1
rc-pa1-ru-abapa.pa1.garr.net 193.206.137.242
rc-pa1-ru-cnr-iamc.pa1.garr.net 193.204.218.58
rc-pa1-ru-unipa.pa1.garr.net 193.206.137.210
SS rc-ss-ru-sarss.ss.garr.net 193.206.140.98
VE rc-ve-ru-cnrve.ve.garr.net 193.206.140.154
UR
rc-an-rc-ur.ur.garr.net 193.206.134.238
rc-an-rc-ur-l2.ur.garr.net 193.206.134.178
FG
rt-ba1-ru-izs-foggia.ba1.garr.net 193.206.142.106
rc-fg-ru-unifg.fg.garr.net 193.206.143.214
FRA
re1-fra-ru-enea-frascati.fra.garr.net 193.206.136.54
re2-fra-ru-kloe.fra.garr.net 193.206.136.198
re1-fra-ru-lnf.fra.garr.net 193.206.136.206
Level3 www.bbc.co.uk 212.58.244.69
Cogent www.kernel.org 149.20.4.69
NAMEX www.telecom.it 62.149.130.234
MIX www.clubnautilus.it 212.35.204.132
VSIX VSIX peering link 95.140.128.11
GEANT lhcopn-cnaf.cern.ch 192.16.166.18
Table 4.1: targets used in this campaigns and, where available, their domain
name
The server used a static list to assign targets. Only one device was used
(and allowed to receive jobs) during the experiment. The device used a
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retry time of 1.5 seconds and ﬁxed destination MDA mode. I didn't use
varying destination mode since it's based on the assumption that two nodes
are topologically close if their IP addresses are close too; this assumption
does not hold in the GARR network. Since the goal of this experiment is
to reconstruct the GARR backbone, a maximum TTL value of 11 has been
used (with the exception of the analysis toward lhcopn-cnaf.cern.ch, which
has been cut as soon as reached the CERN network. The server did not
specify other parameters, so the default settings were used. A full job cycle
took approximately 15 seconds, including communication2.
2The server is multithreaded: since network communications are terminated as soon
as possible, the client will reconnect to the server as soon as possible; meanwhile, the
server will evaluate the received data.
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Figure 4.2: PoP level
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The data validation is straightforward: the PoP-level map in ﬁgure 4.2
represents correctly the backbone. The client succeeded in revealing all the
devices, and the server merged correctly each cluster of data3. Figures 4.3,
4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 shows the router-level map divided in four areas:
PI ﬁgure 4.3; Pisa, Firenze and Torino.
BO ﬁgure 4.4; Bologna, Ancora, Urbino, Padova, Venezia, Trento, Bari,
Foggia and Matera, along with VISX.
MI ﬁgure 4.5; Milano, Pavia and Trieste, along with MIX, L3, GEANT,
SWITCH and CERN.
RM ﬁgure 4.6; Roma, Frascati, Fucino, Napoli, Cagliari, Sassari, Catania,
Palermo, Catanzaro, along with NAMEX and Cogent.
3The server has a quarantine mechanism that isolates two instances of a map location,
discovered in two diﬀerent analyses, that describe diﬀerent situations although they both
refer to the same network subset. These two instances are in quarantine until one of them
reaches an acceptable conﬁdence level. During this campaign no conﬂicts were found.
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Figure 4.5: GARR network, MI area
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Figure 4.6: GARR network, RM area
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A few considerations:
• BA1 (node 42) is usually reached through FI1 and BO1 (nodes 3 and
4, ﬁgure 4.4). A temporary traﬃc spike changed OSPF costs (which
are visible in the live weathermap) so that the path with RM2 and
NA1 (nodes 24 and 23, ﬁgure 4.6) was the best route. I exploited this
situation to collect more data, that would've been hidden otherwise.
• Nodes 25, 26 and 29 (in PA1, see ﬁgure 4.6) are actually the same
router, but the dealiasing process failed to group them; repeating
the analysis multiple times always showed diﬀerent conﬁgurations, so
that the server will eventually merge them all each time a new analylis
bring new dealiasing information.
• The two consecutive links between 65, 66 and 68 (in order, see ﬁgure
4.6) do not have a known IP address. The TTL skipping mechanism
reached node 68 with a +2 bonus (the maximum allowed in this exper-
iment), indicating that there are two non-responding routers. For this
reason I was unable to insert node 66 in neither Cogent network nor
RM2 PoP groups. Note that, however, if further analysis should not
ﬁnd these unknown nodes, the server will update its graph removing
them, or replacing with a new node.
• Node 18 and 20 (in PV, see ﬁgure 4.5) are actually the same router,
but the dealiasing process failed to group them. As per PA1, repeating
the analysis multiple times yielded diﬀerent groupings.
Thanks to parallel MDA we were able to correctly map the GARR net-
work and its PoPs interconnections in less than 20 minutes with only one
device. mYriadi client technology is fast and eﬃcient as this experiment
demonstrated.
4.2 Examples of analyses with diﬀerent MDA
modes
This chapter has the sole purpose of showing the diﬀerences between ICMP
ﬁxed destination (4.8), ICMP varying destination (4.7), UDP ﬁxed desti-
nation (4.9) and UDP varying destination (4.10).
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These tests were executed from a home network, where dsldevice.lan is
the NAPT router, to the same GARR node: rt-mi2-ru-infnge.mi2.garr.net.
The router is connected via ADSL to Tiscali, an Italian ISP. Be aware that
these analysis are based on an unknown network, and that their only scope
is to provide a basis to compare each mode. Nevertheless, the same network
structure can be recognized in every scenario, although with very diﬀerent
levels of detail.
Figure 4.7: ICMP analysis, varying destination
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Figure 4.8: ICMP analysis, ﬁxed destination
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Figure 4.9: UDP analysis, ﬁxed destination
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Figure 4.10: UDP analysis, varying destination
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Let's start by comparing ICMP to UDP. In Chapter 2 I wrote that an ICMP
traceroute would discover less node than a UDP traceroute. This statement
holds true also for these analyses: it's likely that many ISP's routers do not
respond to ICMP packets. Let's consider ﬁgure 4.8 and ﬁgure 4.9, which
diﬀers in the second half of the graphs. The ﬁrst diﬀerent block is showed
in ﬁgure4.12, where UDP detected more nodes. In addition, ICMP did not
merge routers 1 and 9 together, but UDP did. Since most of the new routers
in the UDP block (subﬁgure 4.11b) reach node 7 with the same IP address,
it's likely that they are the same router.
In addition, routers 1, 3 and 4 are actually the same router, as a standalone
MIDAR execution would show. This is a minor error and it can be ignored
since:
• multiple analyses from multiple client will eventually converge to the
correct topology;
• the server keeps an AS map, completely hiding these details.
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(b) ﬁrst diﬀerent block in the UDP analysis
Figure 4.11: analysis with ﬁxed destination, ﬁrst diﬀerent block between
ICMP (a) and UDP (b)
The second block is in ﬁgure 4.12. It's almost the same block, but the UDP
analysis failed to merge nodes 8 and 13 in what is router 6 in ICMP's graph.
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Figure 4.12: analysis with ﬁxed destination, second diﬀerent block between
ICMP (a) and UDP (b)
MIDAR, as already seen in section 2.4, is not a perfect, 100% correct
dealiasing technique, especially in this implementation that sacriﬁces accu-
racy for data eﬃciency. Having a server which collects and merges data
into a single graph greatly improves the dealiasing process.
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Now let's compare ﬁxed destination mode to varying destination mode.
The latter discovers much more links than the former one. Consider nodes
2 and 13 in ﬁgure 4.10, which were discussed in a ﬁxed destination context
in ﬁgure 4.12. Using UDP with varying destination discovered a new link
between nodes 2 and 13, so they cannot be the same router. This again
stresses out the importance of having a server capable of merging clients
data.
4.3 NAPT bypass validation
To validate the NAPT bypass mechanism I proposed in subsection 3.3.7
I developed a small Python script. This script, built upon the mYthon
library4, requires the deﬁnition of almost all parameters that are used in a
probe, as in listing 4.1.
Listing 4.1: NAPT test usage
f e d e r i c o :mYthon f e d e r i c o $ python napt . py
Usage : napt . py pr ivate IP ta r g e t TTL TOS srcPort
destPort SN newPort
It will send two diﬀerent probes: the ﬁrst one will be used to compute
∆, while the second one will use the computed value to correctly guess its
answer's checksum. Let's add more details to the required parameters:
privateIP the IP of the device's network interface, which must be attached
to a private network.
target the URL of the both probes' target.
TTL the Time to Live value that both probes will have.
ToS the Type of Service that must be set in both probes.
srcPort the UDP source port number used by both probes.
4mYthon is mYriadi for Python; it's a simple Python library that implements generic
probes and graph mangling. It helped in many aspect, notably the development of the
NAPT bypass technique itself and to understand how to manipulate ICMP and UDP
checksums.
CHAPTER 4. VALIDATION 101
destPort the UDP destination port number used by the ﬁrst probe.
SN the sequence number used in the ﬁrst probe, while the second probe
will use SN +1.
newPort the UDP destination port number used by the second probe.
The script executes the following steps:
1. parse all parameters;
2. resolve target parameter into an IP address;
3. ﬁnd the public IP address of the router5;
4. craft the ﬁrst probe and create a payload that ﬁxes its checksum to
sn;
5. send the ﬁrst probe and read its answer's checksum;
6. if the script runs in a device behind a NAPT it won't correctly guess
the device, and will evaluate ∆;
7. craft the second probe with newPort and create a payload that ﬁxes
its checksum to sn +1 ;
8. the script will compute four possible checksums before sending the
probe;
9. send the second probe and read its answer's checksum;
10. the test will be passed if one of the four proposed checksums is the
same as the one read.
5There are three possible way to obtain the router's public IP address without mYr-
iadi server:
• use a website that provides this service, like http://canihazip.com/s/, which is a
two-liner in Python;
• use NAT-PMP, a simple yet elegant protocol to communicate with NAPTs and to
request port mappings;
• use UPNP and its extension.
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The test has been repeated many times, each time yielding the same result.
Listing 4.2 show the output of one execution:
Listing 4.2: NAPT test output
1 f e d e r i c o :mYthon f e d e r i c o $ python napt . py 192 . 1 68 . 1 . 7 1
www. ke rne l . org 2 0 2000 2020 54000 33333
2 F i r s t probe : got 0xf967 , expected one o f [ ' 0 xd2f0 ' , '0
xe926 ' ]
3 Delta i s e f b f
4
5 Second probe : got 0 xf968 which i s in [ ' 0 xd2f2 ' , '0
xe928 ' , '0 xf968 ' , '0 xf967 ' ]
6
7 www. ke rne l . org pass
To further validate this method, I implemented a simple automatic test
tool, which repeated the test 250 times with three diﬀerent targets; each
instance of the NAPT test has random parameters. The results are in table
4.2.
Website Pass Skip Fail Quality
www.bbc.co.uk 250 0 0 100%
www.kernel.org 250 0 0 100%
www.unipi.it 249 1 0 99,8%
Table 4.2: NAPT bypass large scale test
www.unipi.it reported a skipped test due to packet loss; repeating the test
gave diﬀerent ratios, however reaching 100% from time to time.The quality
is deﬁned in equation 4.1:
quality =
pass+ 0.5 ∗ skip
pass+ skip+ fail
(4.1)
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Software is like entropy. It is diﬃcult to grasp, weighs nothing,
and obeys the second law of thermodynamics; i.e. it always
increases.
Norman Ralph Augustine
In this work, I've described the current diﬃculties of creating an Internet
topological map as they have been encountered by many projects. I've also
explained the limits of the traditional traceroute and how to overcome them
with Paris Traceroute and its evolution, MDA.
I've then presented mYriadi, a powerful and scalable mapping platform
that executes an improved traceroute version based on MDA. I've described
the overall client-server architecture and its macroscopic behavior, to then
describe in detail the client structure. I've then introduced the Tracerouter
analysis and its characteristics.
To demonstrate the correct behavior of the whole platform I've then pro-
posed a traceroute campaign aimed at reconstructing the GARR network.
A standalone test proved the validity of the NAPT bypass algorithm.
mYriadi shows a great potential, with its ability to handle a sheer quantity of
monitors with minimum cost, its quality and its ability to adapt and extends
through modules. The high diﬀusion of iOS device creates an enormous
potential user base.
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5.1 Future works
In this section I'll brieﬂy introduce some topics that might deserve further
investigation as a possible expansion of this work:
Complete IPv6 traceroute support the need to switch from IPv4 to
v6 is strong, and since the year 2000 many systems started to support
it. The client appliance partially supports IPv6, but IPv6 protocols
and utilities, like ICMP6[27, 28], are still missing. At the time of the
writing, the server appliance doesn't support IPv6, yet. Having full
IPv6 support would increase corporate interest in this project, since
this topic is gaining more and more attention each day. In addition,
a new dealiasing technique that works with IPv6 is missing.
Secure and compressed communications mYriadi's client-server pro-
tocol should be updated to require secure data transmission; even
though mYriadi does not collect any personal information, it's still
high desirable that every information sent should be encrypted. Adding
a compression method would allow the client to send more data using
less bytes.
Net neutrality network operators apply limitations to speciﬁc network
applications, i.e. VoIP. Our platform can be improved to estimate
the so-called network neutrality, a measurement of the restrictions
that a network imposes to a certain traﬃc category. Our distributed
platform has the potential to beneﬁt this kind of analysis, since we
have an high quantity of clients available, and the quality of the mea-
surement would be high: instead of using two ﬁxed endpoints, that
could easily be in privileged network area (as it happens with static
traceroute monitors that are far from access networks), we would es-
timate the network neutrality to a certain service with monitors that
would potentially be in the same spot where end users might use such
service.
Other platforms support although this work is based on iPhone and,
generally, iOS powered devices, the techniques shown here can be
used also in other devices. Android, for example, is drawing more
users to its side each day, and it's deﬁnitely a platform that requires
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our attention. Work is needed to understand what are each platform's
limitation and how to work around them as I did on iOS.
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